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ABSTRACT 
Evidence  from three multicountry  models  is used to assess  the current- 
account  effects  of  U.S.  and  Japanese  fiscal  policies.  Asymmetries  in the 
effects of U.S. and Japanese  policies  are analyzed  in some detail, and 
attribuced  to differences  in  country  size,  in trade  patterns  (which  have 
only  a small effect)  and in the extent  to which induced  changes  in real 
exchange  rates  switch  demand  from  domestic  to foreign  output.  Fiscal 
policy  has aubstantial  current  account  effeccs  in  the models.  For example, 
switching  $50 billion  of suatained  government  spending  from  the United States 
to Japan  would,  in the third year,  improve the U.S.  current  account by 
$24 billion and  worsen that of Japan  by $20 billion.  Induced changes in 
nominal  exchange  rates  are found  to play  a relatively  small  role in deter- 
mining  the effects  of fiscal policy  on the nominal  current  account. 
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1.  Introduction 
To  what  extent  do  the  current  account imbalances  among the  major  industrial 
countries, the  Asian  NlCs  and  the  heavily  indebted  countries  of  South  and  North 
America represent the  inevitable  counterparts  of  fiscal  imbalances?  To  what 
extent  are  these  imbalances  likely  to  respond  to  changes  in  fiscal  policies  in 
the  major  industrial  countries?  To  what  extent  are  exchange  rate  changes  a 
necessary part  of  translating  changes  in  fiscal  policy into  changes  in  external 
balances? These  are  three  of the  key  issues  facing  domestic  and  international 
macroeconomic policy.  This  paper attempts  to  address  these  issues  by  using 
evidence  from three  major  multicountry  models  to  explain  the  effects  that 
fiscal  policies in  Japan  and  the  United  States  have  on  their  own  current 
account balances  as  well  as  on  the  current  balance  of  the  other  country. 
There  has  already been  a  substantial  amount  of  quantitative  research  on  the 
linkages  between  fiscal  policies  and  the  current  account of  the  United  States. 
Most of  the  existing  multinational  models  were  involved  in  a  comparative 
exercise in  1985,  in  which  one  of  the  major  experiments  involved  comparing the 
international  effects  of  fiscal  policies in  the  United  States  and  in  the  rest 
of  the  OECD  (ROECD).1  The  sources of  the  U.S.  current account deficit, 
including  the  roles  of  divergent  fiscal  policies  in  the  United  States  and  the 
1  The  results  are  presented  in  full  in  Bryant,  Henderson,  Holtham,  Hooper, 
and  Symansky,  eds.  (1988),  and  shown  briefly  in  section 2  of this  paper. 2 
rest  of  the  OECD,  treated  as  a  single  unit,  were  the  subject of  a  workshop  at 
the  Brookings Institution  in  January  1987,  based  on  results  from a  number of 
major  multicountry  models.2 
The  EPA  symposium  extends  the  earlier work  in  a  number  of  respects:  the 
research is  symmetric  in  its  consideration  of  the  Japanese  and  United  States 
current accounts,  the  perspective  is  forward-looking,  and  the  structure  of  the 
Japanese economy is  being  studied  in  some detail,  both  on  its  own  and  in 
comparison with  other  countries.  In  addition,  more  attention  is  paid  to  the 
effects  of each  country's policies on  the  other  country's  current account,  and 
to  the  explanation  of  any  asymmetries  that  may  appear  when  the  effects  of 
Japanese and  U.S.  policies  are compared.  Three  multicountry  models  were  used  to 
prepare  evidence  for  the  seminar:  those  of the  Japanese Economic  Planning 
Agency  (the  EPA  World  Model,  referred  to  here  as  EPA).  the  U.S.  Federal Reserve 
Board  (the  MultiCountry  Model,  referred  to  here  as  MCM),  and  the  OECD  (the 
INTERLINK  model,  referred  to  here  as  OECD). 
This  paper deals  principally  with  the  current  account effects  of  fiscal 
policies,  based  on  simulation  experiments  run  over  a  six  year  horizon  extending 
from  1987  through  1992.  The  figures  drawn  for  this  paper show  results  over the 
whole  six  years.  while  the  analytical  tables  explaining  the  current  account 
effects  in  more  detail  concentrate  on  the  first-year  and  third-year  results  of 
the  changes  in  fiscal  policy.  The  typical  fiscal  policy  change studied  is  a 
2  The  main  results,  which  are  presented  in  Bryant,  Hoitham  and  Hooper, 
eds.,  (1988)  showed  (e.g.  Helkie  and  Hooper  1988,  p.  48)  that  divergent fiscal 
policies in  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  OECD  could  explain most  of 
the  U.S.  current account deficit  that  emerged  during  the  1980s. 3 
sustained  increase  in  real  government  spending  equal  to  1%  of  baseline real 
GNP.  Money  supplies  are  held  fixed  and  exchange  rates are  flexible  in  the 
experiments that  are  the  main  focus  of this  paper.  Comparable  results  under 
fixed exchange rates will,  however,  be  used  to  show  the  role that  exchange rate 
movements  play  in  determining  the  link  between  budget  deficits  and  external 
deficits. 
The  paper  starts  with  an  overview  of  some  of  the  main  features  of  the  new 
evidence,  including  comparisons with  the  results  prepared  for  the  earlier 
Brookings conference.  The  analysis  then  turns  to  a  more  intensive  examination 
of  the  reasons  for  some  of  these  results.  This  is  done  in  two  sections, section 
3  dealing  with  the  reasons  for  some  of  the  asymmetries  in  the  current-account 
effects  of  Japanese  and  US.  fiscal  policies,  and  section  4  briefly  analyzing 
the  role  of  exchange  rate  movements  in  establishing  the  relationship  between 
fiscal  policies and  international  imbalances.  The  final  section  then  summarizes 
the  results  and  draws  some implications  for  the  analysis  of fiscal  policy. 
2.  Overview  of the  Evidence 
To  provide  a  basis  for  comparison,  Figure  1  summarizes  the  average 
macroeconomic effects  of  U.S.  and  ROECD  fiscal  expansion,  as  represented  by  the 
multicountry  models drawn  together  for  the  1985  Brookings  experiments.3  The 
The  results  were  put  in  comparable  form  in  October  1985,  in  preparation 
for  a  conference  held  in  March  1986.  The  average  results  shown  in  figure  1,  and 
in  the  bottom panels  of  figure  2,  are  taken  from Table  B  (p.  52)  and  Table  G 
(p.  113)  of  Part  Two  of  Bryant,  Henderson,  Hoitham,  Hooper,  and  Symansky,  eds., 
(1988).  The  signs of  the  results  of  the  U.S.  fiscal  policy have  been  changed to 
make it  a  fiscal  expansion,  for  easier  comparison  with  the  ROECD  results,  and 
with  the  results  prepared  for the  EPA  Symposium,  all  of  which refer  to  fiscal 4 
bottom  panels  of  Figure  2  then  show  the  average  U.S.  current  account effects, 
from  the  same experiments,  of  U.S.  fiscal  expansion.4  The  top  panels  of  figure 
2  show the  U.S.  current  account effects  separately  for  each  of  the  three  models 
(EPA,  MCM,  and  OECD)  involved  in  the  EPA  Symposium.  By  showing  comparable 
results  for the  1985  and  1988  experiments,  these figures  are  especially  useful 
in  revealing  any  major  changes  in  model  structure  between  the  two  sets  of 
experiments. The bottom right  two  panels  of figure  3 compare the  1985 and  1988 
results,  from the  same three  models,  for  the  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  policy on 
the  Japanese current balance. 
What are  the  main  features  of  the  1985  results?  In  terms  of  the  first-year 
international  transmission  of  income  in  response  to  fiscal  policies,  the  top 
panels  of  figure  1  show  almost  complete  symmetry  between  U.S.  and  ROECD  fiscal 
policies, with  each  region's fiscal  expansion  raising  real  GNP  at  home  by 
1.25%,  in  response to  a  fiscal  expansion  equal  to  1%  of  GNP,  with  real  GNP  in 
the  other  region  rising  by  O.25%.  This  apparent  symmetry  is  actually the  net 
result of three  asymmetries,  however,  as  the  larger  size  of the  ROECD,  which 
would  tend to  make the  transmission  larger  from  the  ROECD  to  the  United  States 
than  vice  versa,  is  offset  by the  net  effect  of  two  other  factors.  These are 
the  higher  propensity  to  import  in  the  ROECD5 and  the fact  that  50%  of  U.S. 
imports come from the  ROECD,  while  only  12%  of  ROECD  imports come from the 
expansions. 
Comparable  results  for Japanese  fiscal  expansion  are  not available from 
the  1985  experiments. 
1985  imports  were  9%  of GNP  for  the  United  States,  compared to  20%  for 
the  ROECD.  This  factor, which  would  tend  to  make  the transmission relatively 
smaller from the  United  States  to  the  ROECD,  is  more  than  offset  by the 
difference in  trade  patterns  described in  the  text. 5 
United  States. 
This  initial  equality  of  transmission  soon  disappears,  however,  as the 
domestic income effects  of  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  are  crowded  out by the 
higher prices,  exchange  rates  (except for  OECD),  and  interest  rates,  and  an 
increasing proportion  of  the  induced  income  is  in  the  ROECD.  By  contrast,  the 
ROECO  income multiplier  remains  much higher,  with  much  smaller  induced 
increases  in  the  price  level,  in  the  value  of  the  domestic  currencies,  and  in 
interest rates.  The  bottom  right-hand  panel  of  figure  2  shows  the  substantial 
extent  to  which  the  U.S.  current  account continues  to  weaken  in  response  to  the 
fiscal  expansion,  with  the  average  induced  current  account deficit  being  about 
0.5%  of  GNP  by  the  sixth  year  of  the  fiscal  expansion. 
The  upper panels  of  figure  2  show  the  Current  account effects  of  U.S. 
fiscal  expansion  on  a  model-by-model  basis for  the  EPA,  MCM  and  OECD  models, 
with  the  1985  and  1988  results  compared,  expressed  both  in  terms  of  billion 
U.S.  dollars  (on  the  left-hand  side  of  the  page)  and  as  percent  of  GNP.  Looking 
first  at  the  1985  results  from the  three  models,  the  EPA  and  MCM  results  show 
the  U.S.  current  account worsening  by  more  than  the  average  across  all  twelve 
models, while  the  OECD  current  account effects  are  smaller  than  average  and 
show little  tendency to  grow over the  six  years. 
Comparing the  1985  and  1988  results,  it can  be seen  that 
the  models have  changed  slightly,  so  as  to  move  their  estimated  U.S.  current 
account effects  closer to  each  other,  and  to  the  average  from the  1985 
experiments.  Thus  all  three  models  now  show  the  U.S.  current  account 6 
consequences growing  with  time,  and  to  be  between  0.5%  and  0.7%  of  GNP  by  the 
sixth  year  of  the  fiscal  expansion. 
Turning to  figure  3,  illustrating  the  effects  of  fiscal  expansion  on  the 
Japanese current  balance,  the  bottom  right-hand  panels  show  that  in  1985  the 
EPA  model  showed  by  far the  largest  Japanese  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  policy, 
growing  with  time  to  reach  almost  2%  of  GNP  by the  sixth  year.  In  the  1988 
results,  these  effects  have  been  cut  in  half,  although  they  are  still  somewhat 
larger than  those  of  the  MCM,  and  twice  as  high  as  those of  the  OECD  model.  In 
all  three  models  the  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  on  the  Japanese current 
balance are  as  great as  on  the  U.S.  current  balance,  and  somewhat  higher in  the 
case  of  EPA,  where  the  effects  are  measured  as  a  percent  of  baseline GNP  in  all 
cases. 
The  top  half  of  figure  3  contains  the  new  results  showing  the  Japanese 
current account effects  of  Japanese  fiscal  expansion.  These  are  largest for 
EPA,  but  in  all  three  models  are  less  than  one  half  as  large as the  effects  of 
U.S.  fiscal  policy,  as  shown  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  figure.  All  three  models 
show  the  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  to  worsen  the  Japanese  current  account by 
about  500  billion  Yen  in  the  first year,  as  shown  by the  top  right-hand  panel 
of  figure  3.  Thereafter,  the  EPA  effects  continue  to  grow,  while  the  MCM 
effects  remain  fairly constant  and  the  OECD  effects  gradually  disappear. 
As  seen  by  comparing figures  2  and  3,  the  three  models  give  very  similar 
estimates  of the  effects  of U.S.  fiscal  policy on  the  U.S.  current  account,  but 
rather  different estimates  of  the  effects  of  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  on  the 7 
Japanese current account.  To  understand  these  differences  better,  we  can 
exploit  the  fact  that  the  current account  is  simply  the  difference  between 
private  investment  and  the  sum  of  gross  private  saving  and  net  saving  of  the 
public  sector. Similarly,  any  worsening  in  the  real  current account deficit  in 
response  to  fiscal  stimulus  can  be  expressed  equally  well  as  the  amount  by 
which induced absorption  exceeds induced real  output.  To  make use  of  these 
alternative  ways  of  viewing  the  current account,  figure  4  shows  the  own-country 
effects  of  fiscal  expansions  in  terms  of  real  GNP,  real  absorption,  gross 
private  savings and  gross  private  investment.6 
Looking  first  at  the  results  for  Japan,  the  EPA  model's  increases  in  real 
absorption and  GNP,  with  real  absorption  steadily  rising  to  a  level  2%  above 
baseline by  the  sixth  year,  show  that  the  growing  current  account effects  shown 
in  figure  3  are  not  the  result of  crowding  out,  but  of  imports  increasing  with 
absorption and  income  as  all  three  continue  to  grow.  For  the  other  two  models, 
the  real  GNP  and  domestic  absorption  effects  are  both  crowded  out;  for the  MCM 
some  of  this  crowding  out takes  the  form  of  increased real  imports,  but  in 
neither  case  is  there  a  widening  gap  between  absorption  and  GNP.  Thus in  none 
of  the  three  models is  there  evidence  of the  multiplier  process being  truncated 
by increasing real  import penetration.  The  panel  showing  private  investment  as 
a  share  of  GNP  reveals  that  the  crowding  out of  domestic  absorption  that  takes 
place  in  MCM  and  OECD  is  of  private  investment,  which is  slightly  above 
6  The  matching  results  for  the  induced  changes  in  the  government  balance 
as  a  share  of  GNP,  which reveal  the  extent  to  which  additional  tax  revenues 
serve to  finance  the  increase  in  government  spending  (equal  to  1%  of  GNP),  are 
shown  in  the  second-row  panels  of  figures  5,  7,  and  9,  which  contain  the  model- 
by-model results  for  EPA,  MCM  and  OECD,  respectively.  Since  the  government 
spending  is  financed  by  borrowing,  the  cumulating  debt  also  increases 
government spending  further  through  its  impact  on  public  debt  charges. 8 
baseline throughout  for  EPA,  but  increasingly  below  baseline  for  MCM,  and 
especially for  OECD. 
The  situation  is  quite  different  in  the  case of  the  United  States.  Here, 
all  the  models agree that the current account deficit  will  continue  to  grow  as 
a  share  of  baseline  GNP,  reaching  0.5%  by  the  sixth  year.  As  shown  by  figure  4, 
however,  this  agreement  about  the  current  account effects  is  the  net  result of 
some  offsetting  differences.  Although  all  three  models  show declining  real 
multipliers for  the  United  States,  the  first-year  multiplier  is  about  1.75  for 
MCM  compared to  about  1.0  for the  OECD,  with  EPA  midway  between. 
Although  all three  models show  steady  crowding  out of the  U.S.  GNP  effects 
as  time  progresses,  the  MCM  multiplier  falls  much  less  slowly  than  the  other 
two,  and  is  still  above  1.0  in  the  sixth  year. There  is  an  offsetting 
difference in  the  behaviour  of  real  absorption,  which  is  continually  falling, 
relative to  its  initial  increase,  in  MCM  and  OECD,  while  consistently  remaining 
roughly 1.5%  above  baseline  values  for  EPA.  Higher  investment  is  the  key  to  the 
sustained  absorption  in  EPA,  with  investment  higher  by  almost  1%  of  GNP  by  the 
sixth year. In  the other two  models,  investment  is  below  baseline by increasing 
amounts,  averaging  about  0.25%  of  GNP  over  the  six year  period. 
The  models  also  reveal  some substantial  differences  in  U.S.  private  savings 
behaviour,  with  savings  up  by  much more  than  the  induced  change in  GNP  in  OECD. 
up  only  slightly in  MCM,  and  with  the  EPA  falling  in  between.  The  EPA  estimate 
of  induced private  savings  (as  a  %  of  GNP)  continually  rises,  thus  helping  to 
finance the  growing  government  deficit. 9 
Figures  5  through  10  broaden  the focus to  consider both  the  own-country  and 
the  cross-country  effects  of Japanese  and  U.S.  and  fiscal  policies on  a 
comparative  basis.  To  do  this,  there  are  two  figures  for  each  of  the  three 
models.  The  left-hand  panels  of  each  figure  show  the  own-country  and  cross- 
country  effects  of  Japanese fiscal  expansion,  while  the  right-hand  panels  do 
the  same for  U.S.  fiscal  expansion.  What  are  the  main  points  of  similarity  and 
difference  revealed  by  these  figures? 
Important  points  of  similarity  include: 
-  In  all  three  models,  U.S.  fiscal  policy has  large  and  growing  effects  on 
the  current accounts  of  both  countries,  with  the  effects  on  Japan  being about 
as  large as  those on  the  United  States,  when  measured  as  percent of GNP. 
-  In  all  three  models,  Japanese fiscal  policy  initially  affects  the Japanese 
current balance by  about  as  much  as  does  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  (although  of 
course in  the  opposite  direction),  while  the  influence  on  the  U.S.  current 
account is  close to  zero. 
-  In  all  three  models,  U.S.  interest  rates  rise  by  substantial  amounts  that 
increase  as  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  continues. y the  sixth  year,  U.S.  long- 
term rates are  150  to  200  basis  points  higher  in  nominal  terms.  Japanese 
interest  rates  are  pulled  up  by  about  one-third  as  much  (less in  MCM)  in 
response to  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion. 10 
-  In  all  three  models,  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  produces continuing  U.S. 
inflation  averaging  about  0.5%  annually  in  each  of  the  models. Thus  real  long- 
term  interest  rates are  100  to  150  basis  points  higher  by  the  sixth  year. 
-  In  all  three  models,  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  produces  a  substantial  change  in 
the  U.S.  unemployment  rate,  while  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  has  almost  no 
impact  on  the  Japanese  unemployment  rate. 
The  most  striking  of  these  results  is  the  contrast  between  the  very  large 
current account effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  and  the  much  smaller  effects 
of  Japanese fiscal  expansion.  This  asymmetry  has  been  the  subject of  much 
comment,  and  will  be  analyzed  in  some detail  in  the  next  section  of  the  paper. 
Important  differences  among  the  models  include: 
-  Although  all  three  models  show the  Japanese  GNP  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal 
expansion  to  be  greater than  the  U.S.  effects  by  the  sixth  year,  the  difference 
is  much greater for EPA,  which  shows  Japanese  GNP  up  by  over  2%  by  the  fifth 
year.  This  appears to  reflect  a  possibly  non-convergent  real  multiplier  process 
in  the  Japanese  block of the  EPA  model. 
-  Although  none  of  the  models  shows  large changes  in  the  Japanese price  level 
in  response to  Japanese fiscal  expansion,  there  are  noticeable differences 
among the  models.  There  is  no  induced  inflation  in  EPA,  despite  the  much 
stronger multiplier  process in  operation  in that  model. 11 
-  By  contrast,  in  response  to  U.S.  fiscal  expansion,  the  EPA  model  shows 
substantial  Japanese  inflation,  even  more  than  in  the  United  States  over the 
first  two  years,  while  MCM  shows  about  one-third  as  much inflation  as  in  the 
United  States  and  the  OECD  almost  none. 
-  In  both  EPA  and  MCM,  the  U.S.  dollar  appreciates  by  about  3%  in  nominal 
terms  in  response to  U.S.  fiscal  expansion,  while  the  OECD  model  shows  a 
depreciation  of  the  dollar. 
-  In  real  terms,  MCM  shows  the  real  value  of  the  dollar returning  to  baseline 
by  the  sixth  year,  while  EPA  shows  a  real  appreciation  of  about  4%  and  OECD  a 
real  appreciation  of  about  2%. 
-  The  initial  depreciation  of  the  dollar  in  OECD  under  U.S.  fiscal  expansion 
appears to  be  related  primarily  to  the  movement  of  short-term  interest  rates 
outside  the  United  States.  In  that  model,  Japanese  short-term  rates  rise  almost 
as  much  as  U.S.  rates  in  response  to  U.S.  fiscal  expansion,  while  the  induced 
changes  in  Japanese interest  rates are  much  smaller  in  the  other  two  models.7 
-  All  three  models  show initial  appreciation  of  the  yen  in  response to 
Japanese fiscal  expansion,  although  by  the  sixth  year  the  combination  of  price 
and  exchange rate  changes  are  such that  the  real  value  of  the  yen  is  up  by  2% 
Viewed  ri  terms  of  conventional  LM  and  BP  curves,  a  depreciation  in 
response to  fiscal  expansion  arises if  the  LM  curve  is  flatter  than  the  BP 
curve.  The  rise  in  foreign  interest  rates  can  be  treated  as  an  upward  shift  of 
the  BP  curve,  increasing the  chances that  the  LM  and  IS  curves,  after  the 
latter has  shifted  right  ri  response to fiscal  expansion,  should  intersect 
below  the  BP  curve,  thus  indicating  incipient  depreciation. 12 
in  EPA,  and  down  by  1%  in  MCM  and  OECD. 
The  most  striking  of  the  differences  listed  above  relate  to  the  multiplier 
process in  the  EPA  model  and  to  the  different  movements  of  exchange rates.  The 
latter issue will  be  addressed further  in  section 4.  which  analyzes  in  more 
detail  the  role  of  exchange rate  changes  in  the  transmission  of the  effects  of 
fiscal  policy. 
3.  Asymmetries  in  Current  Balance Effects 
This  section attempts  to  spell  out in  more  detail  why  the  models  show  that 
U.S.  fiscal  policies have  much  larger  effects  on  the  Japanese  current account 
than  vice  versa.  To  do  this  most  clearly,  it is  perhaps  helpful  to  start with 
the  simplest  case,  where  relative  prices are  initially  unchanged  and  all 
current account effects  are  due  to  increases  in  real  imports of  the  country 
undertaking  fiscal  expansion.  In  that  simple  case,  the  effect of  U.S.  fiscal 
expansion  on  the  Japanese current  account  depends  only  on  the  U.S.  multiplier, 
the  U.S.  marginal  propensity  to  import,  and  the  marginal share  of  U.S.  imports 
that  comes  from Japan.  A  similar relationship,  with  the  names changed, 
determines  the  effects  of  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  on  the  U.S.  current 
account. 
If one compares the  Japanese  current  account effects  of  U.S.  fiscal 
expansion  to  the  U.S.  current account effects  of  Japanese fiscal  expansion, 
measuring the  effects  in  relation  to  the second  country's  GNP,  then  the 
relative  size  of the  countries  enters  in  two  ways.  First,  if  the fiscal 13 
expansion  is  defined  in  relation  to  GNP,  then  the  initial  increase  in  spending 
will  be  larger if  the  larger country  expands.  Second,  for  given  trade  ratios 
and  import propensities,  any  change in  real  trade  flows  will  be  a  larger  share 
of  the  smaller country's GNP.  Using  purchasing  power  parity  exchange rates8, 
U.S.  GNP  was  about  28  times  as  large  as  that  of  Japan  in  1987.  This  would 
imply that  if the  two  countries  had  the  same  propensity  to  import  from each 
other,  and  if  both  countries  had  the  same domestic  expenditure  multipliers, 
then  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  of  1%  of  U.S.  GNP would  affect  the Japanese current 
account (measured  as  a  %  of Japanese GNP) by  about  eight times  as  much 
(2.8x2.8=7.84) as  a  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  of  1%  of  GNP  would  affect the 
U.S.  current  account,  measured  as  a  percent  of  U.S.  GNP. 
To  take  a  concrete example,  the  top  right  hand  panels  of  figures  5,  7  and  9 
show  that  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  improves  the  Japanese  current  balance,  in  the 
first  year, by  about  0.25%  of  GNP.  If the  structures  of  the  two  economies  were 
identical,  in  the  manner described  above,  then  one  would  expect  to  find  in  the 
top  left  panel  of  the  same figures  that  the  U.S.  current  balance would  improve 
by  about  0.03%  (= 0.25/7.84)  of U.S.  GNP in  response  to  the  Japanese fiscal 
expansion.  On  average over  the  first year, the  MCM  improvement  is  about  0.045%, 
while  in  EPA  and  OECD  it  is  substantially  less,  about  0.01%. 
In  the  rest  of  this  section,  we  shall  take  a  more  systematic  look  at  the 
nature  and  the  sources of these 
differences, separating  the  influences  operating  through  exchange rate  changes, 
second-round trade  effects,  and  trade  in  services.  This  will  be  done by  a 
8  The  PPP  exchange  rates are  from Blades  and  Roberts  (1987). 14 
series  of  five  tables,  each  of  which  builds  upon  the  previous  tables. 
Table  1  starts by  showing  the  induced  real current account effects  in  the 
expanding  country.  The  first  columns  show  how  induced  real  imports  can  be 
explained  as  the  product  of  the  fiscal  multiplier  and  the  marginal  propensity 
to  import.  Columns  1  and  2  show  the  multipliers  and  marginal  propensities  to 
import under  fixed exchange  rates,9  and  columns 3  and  4  show  how  these two 
numbers  are  altered by  the  induced  changes  in  exchange rates.  The  propensities 
to  import are  for  merchandise  only,  because  of  the  restricted information 
available  about  service imports  in  real  terms. The  numbers  in  column five  for 
induced  real  merchandise imports  are  thus  equal  to  the  increase  in  government 
spending, measured in  billion  1980  yen  for  Japan  and  in  billion  1982  dollars 
for  the  United  States,  times  the flexible  exchange  rate multiplier (from  column 
3)  times  the  marginal  propensity  to  import  (from  column  4)10  Column  6  shows 
the  column  5  figures  as  a  percent  of  baseline  real  GNP,  while  column  7  reports 
the  change in  the  real  current  account balance as  a  percent  of  GNP.  Column  7  is 
thus  equal to  the  negative  of  column  6  plus  any  induced  changes  in  real 
merchandise exports and  net  real  exports of services. 
Comparing  the  results  for  the  United  States  and  Japan,  we  might expect to 
find  fairly  similar  values  in  column  6  for  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
assuming  the  same fiscal  multipliers,  since,  as  shown  at  the  bottom  of the 
These  are  obtained  from the  results  of  the  fiscal  expansions  run  with 
exogenous  exchange rates. 
10  The  "marginal propensities"  reported  are  not the  partial  effect of  real 
GNP  on  real  imports,  but the total  change in  real imports divided by the  total 
change in  real  GNP.  The  numbers  reported  in  column  5  can  thus  be  obtained 
directly from the  simulation  output. 15 
table, Japan  and  the  United  States  had  about  the  same average  propensities to 
import  in  1987.  All  three  models  show  induced  real  imports  in  the  first  year  to 
be  substantially  larger for the  United  States  than  for  Japan:  more  than  50% 
larger in  the  case of  EPA,  twice  as  large  in  MCM  and  more  than  three times  as 
large in  OECD. 
The  reasons  for  the  larger bulge  in  U.S.  imports  differ by  model.  In  the 
case of  EPA,  lhe  import propensities  are  approximately  the  same in  the  two 
countries,  and  the  difference  is  due  entirely  to  the  larger first-year  fiscal 
multiplier  in  the  United  States.  For  MCM,  the  fiscal  multipliers  and  the 
marginal  propensities  are  both  about  50%  larger  for  the  United  States  than  for 
Japan.  For  both  EPA  and  MCM,  the  differences  are  larger with  flexible  than  with 
fixed  exchange rates,  as  would  be  expected  in  the  light  of  the  greater real 
appreciation  of  the  dollar11  that  takes  place  in  those  models.  For  OECD,  the 
difference  appears to  be  entirely  due  to  a  much  higher  U.S.  marginal  propensity 
to  import goods.  This  is  not due  to  exchange  rate  effects,  as  the  U.S. 
depreciates in  nominal  terms  in  that  model  in  response  to  U.S.  fiscal 
expansion. 
How  do  these  comparisons  change  when  account is  taken  of  induced  real 
exports  of  goods,  and  of  net  exports  of  services?  For  both  EPA  and  MCM,  taking 
these  changes  into  account more  than  offsets  the  higher  U.S.  imports of  goods, 
so  that  the  induced real  trade  deficit  is  higher  for  Japan  than  for  the  United 
States.  Before  discussing these  effects  in  slightly  more  detait,  we  first 
The  comparison being  made  here  is  between  the  appreciation  of  the 
dollar  under  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  and  the  appreciation  of  the  yen  under 
Japanese fiscal  expansion. 16 
consider tables 2  and  3,  which spell  out  more  systematically the  sources of the 
asymmetries flowing  through  real  merchandise  imports. 
Table  2  simply  restates  the  induced  real  imports  of  goods  in  terms  of the 
real  GNPs  of  the  two  countries,  to  provide  raw  material  for  table  3,  which 
shows  indices of  asymmetry  and  reveals  their  sources.  The total  index  shown  in 
column  1  of table  3  is,  as  discussed  before,  the  ratio  of  the  effects  of  U.S. 
fiscal  policy (on  Japanese  merchandise  exports  to  the  United  States)  to  the 
effects  of  Japanese fiscal  expansion  (on  U.S.  merchandise  exports  to  Japan), 
where  the  fiscal  expansion  is  1%  of  real  GNP  and  the  induced  real  exports  are 
measured as  percent of  the  exporting  country's real  GNP.  Columns  2  to  5  of 
table  3  show the  components  explaining  the  overall  index  of  asymmetry.  The 
index  in  column  1  is the  product  of  the sub-indices in  columns 2  to  5,  and 
would  take  the  value  of  1.0  if the  two  countries  had  exactly the  same  size  and 
economic  structure. 
Table  3  shows  that  the first-year  indices  of  asymmetry  range  from  about  12. 
for  EPA  to  16.  for  MCM  and  23.  for  OECD,  in  all  cases  well  above  the  value  of 
7.8  that  would  be  accounted  for  simply  by the  differences  in the  sizes  of  Japan 
and  the  United  States.  For  EPA,  the  additional  asymmetry  flows  mainly  from the 
higher value  of  the  U.S.  multiplier.  For  MCM  there  is  an  equally  large 
additional  effect from the  higher  U.S.  marginal  propensity  to  import.  For  OECD, 
the  high  asymmetry is  entirely  due  to  a  marginal  propensity  to  import that  is 
more than  three  times  as  high  for  the  United  States  as  for  Japan.  Trade 
patterns  are  not  part  of  the  explanation  of  the  observed  asymmetry,  as the 
index  in  column  2  is  under  1.0,  reflecting  the  fact  that  in  1987  the  United 17 
States  obtained  21%  of its  merchandise  imports  from  Japan,  while  Japan  obtained 
22%  of  its  merchandise  imports from  the  United  States.12 
Tables 4  and  5  extend  the  analysis  to  cover the  entire  current account in 
nominal  terms,  thus  including  the  effects  of  terms-of-trade  changes  along  with 
the  effects  of  changes  in  the volumes of  goods  and  services  exports.  Table  4 
examines  the  U.S.  current balance effects  of  U.S.  and  Japanese fiscal 
expansion,  while  table  5  shows  the  effects  of the  same  policies on  the  Japanese 
current balance.  To  remove  the  asymmetry  caused  by the  different  size  of  the 
expenditure  increase  in  the  two  countries,  the  size  of  the  Japanese  fiscal 
expansion  is  scaled up  in  table  4  to  be  equal  to  1%  of  U.S.  GNP,  the  same as 
the  fiscal  expansion  in  the  United  States.  This  requires  the  Japanese results 
to  be  multiplied  by  1.9,  which  is  the  ratio  of  U.S.  to  Japanese  GNP5  in  1987, 
when  evaluated  at  average  1987  exchange  rates.13  Similarly,  in  table  5  the  size 
of  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  is  scaled down  to  make  it  equal to  1%  of Japanese 
GNP.  The  numbers  in  table  4  are  reported  in  billion  U.S.  dollars  (at  1982 
prices for  the  real  variables),  while  the  results  in  table  5  are  in  100  billion 
yen  (at  1980  prices for  the  real  variables). 
The  figures  in  column  5  of  table  4  show  that,  by  the  end  of  the  third 
12  These percentages  are  based  on  merchandise  trade  data  for  the  first 
three  quarters  of  1987. 
13  The  ratio  of  GNP5  at  market exchange  rates  is  used  to  make the  fiscal 
expansion  the  same size,  in  terms  of  U.S.  dollars,  in  both  countries,  so  as  to 
facilitate  the  comparisons  in  terms  of  the  changes  to  current  accounts  in 
nominal  terms.  Since  market  value  of  the yen  was  well  above  its  PPP  value  in 
1987  (almost 50%  above,  as  reported  by  Blades  and  Roberts  (1988)).  this  implies 
that  the  real  value  of  the  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  is  substantially  less  than 
in  the  United  States,  by roughly the  ratio  1.9/2.8. 18 
year, a  $50  billion  increase  in  U.S.  spending  would  worsen  the  U.S.  current 
account  by  about  $20  billion  (slightly  more  in  MCM),  while  a  similar amount  of 
spending  in  Japan  would  improve  the  U.S.  current  account by  $4  to  $5  billion  in 
MCM  and  OECD,  and  about  $2  billion  in  EPA. 
In  the  EPA  and  MCM  results,  the  higher  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar brought 
about  by fiscal  expansion  produces terms-of-trade  gains  (shown  in  column  2,  and 
included as  part  of  the  column  5  figure)  averaging  about  $3  billion  in  the 
first  year.  For  OECD,  with  its  slight depreciation  of  the  dollar in  response to 
either  U.S.  or  Japanese  fiscal  expansion,  there  are  terms-of-trade  losses  to 
the  United  States  in  both  cases. EPA  and  MCM  show  yen  appreciation  in  response 
to  Japanese fiscal  expansion,  so  they  agree  with  OECD  in  showing-terms-of-trade 
losses  to  the  United  States  in  this  case. 
Table  5  shows  the  effects  of Japanese  and  scaled-down  U.S.  fiscal  expansion 
on  the  Japanese current  balance,  measured  in  100  billion  yen.  In  the  first  year 
a  fiscal  expansion  of  roughly  35  hundred  billion  yen  worsens the  Japanese 
current account by  roughly  5  to  7  hundred  billion  yen  if the  fiscal  expansion 
takes  place  in  Japan,  or  improves  the  Japanese  current balance  by  3.5  to  5 
hundred  billion yen  if the  fiscal  expansion  takes  place  in  the  United  States. 
The  reasons  for  the  differences  between  the  results  in  tables  4  and  5  lie 
in  the  higher U.S.  marginal  propensity  to  import (especially as  modelled by 
OECD)  and  in the  higher U.S.  multipliers,  initially  in  EPA  and  throughout  for 
MCM.  As  has  already been  seen,  the  crowding  out of  domestic  output  in  the 
United  States  increases  as  time  passes,  with  a  larger fraction of  the 19 
additional  U.S.  spending  taking  the  form of  imports.  In  the way  our 
calculations have  been  made,  this  shows  up  as  a  higher  U.S.  marginal  propensity 
to  import, which  then  increases  the  effects  of  the  U.S.  fiscal  policy on  the 
Japanese current balance.  There  is  less  tendency  for  this  to  happen  in  response 
to  Japanese fiscal  policy,  so that  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  eventually  has  larger 
effects  on  the  Japanese  current balance than  does  Japanese  policy. 
4.  The  Role  at  Exchange  Rates 
In  discussions about  the  policies  required  to  remove  external  imbalances, 
there  are  often  disagreements  about  the  relative  roles  to  be  played  by  fiscal 
policies  and  by  exchange  rate  changes.  At  one  extreme,  it  is  argued,  for 
example,  that  a  reduction  in  the  external  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar will  suffice 
to  restore  U.S.  current account  balance.  At  the  other  extreme,  it  is  argued 
that  an  exchange  rate  change  is  neither necessary  nor  desirable,  and  that  a 
drop  in  the  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar  would  induce  inflationary  effects  in  the 
United  States  and  recessionary  effects  abroad  that  would  remove  any  positive 
effects  on  the  balance of  payments. 
The  evidence  presented  so  far  in  this  paper suggests  that  exchanges  rates 
do  move  as  part of  the  adjustment  to  fiscal  policy,  but  their  relative 
importance,  either  as  a  part  of  the  translation  of  fiscal  actions  to  external 
balances,  or  as  independent  instruments,  remains  to  be  assessed.  This  is  done 
in  figure  11,  which shows  how  much difference  exchange  rate  movements  make to 
the  income  and  current  balance  effects  of  fiscal  policy. 20 
The  left-hand  side  of  figure  11  shows  the  effects  on  Japan  of  Japanese 
fiscal  expansion,  with  the  right-hand  side  doing  the  same for  the  United 
States.  The  top  panels  show the  exchange  rate  changes  that  are  triggered by  the 
fiscal  expansion.  with  all  fiscal  expansions  showing  appreciations  of  the  local 
currency  except  for  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  in  the OECD  model.  The  next  panels 
show the  difference  between  the  fiscal  multipliers  triggered  by these changes 
in  exchange  rates,  and  the  bottom  two  rows show  the  resulting  changes  in  real 
net  exports and  in  nominal  current balances. 
The  multiplier results  show a  difference  among  the  models in  the  real 
output  effects  of exchange  rate  change.  All  three  models  show lower  multipliers 
in  response to the  appreciations  of  the  yen,  and  MOM  shows  a  parallel  result 
for  the  United  States.  OECD  shows  the  dollar  to  depreciate,  and  has  a  slightly 
higher multiplier as  a  consequence.  The  exception  to  the  pattern  is  provided  by 
EPA.  which  shows  a  higher  multiplier  (after  the  second  year)  in  response to  the 
appreciation of the  dollar. 
The  current balance  results  show  that  the  induced  appreciations  do  tend  to 
contribute  to  the  current account effects  of  the  fiscal  policies,  but that the 
contributions  are  a  small  part  of  the  total  current balance  effects  shown  in 
earlier figures.  Since  the  induced  exchange  rate  changes  vary  over time,  and 
among  models,  it  is difficult  to  assess  their  contributions  clearly from figure 
11.  To  provide a  clearer  picture,  figure  12  shows  the  effects  of  10%  exogenous 
depreciations, first  of  the  yen  and  then  of  the  dollar. 
Figure  12  also compares the  results  of  partial  and  whole-model  simulations 21 
of  exchange rate  changes  to  show  the  extent  to  which macroeconomic feedbacks 
alter  the  current balance  effects  of  exchange  rate  changes.  The  left-hand 
panels  show the  effects  of  a  10%  depreciation  on  the  depreciating  country's 
real  net  exports  and  nominal  current  accounts,  based  on  partial  simulations  of 
each  model's  current  account block,  while  the  right-hand  panels  show  the 
corresponding results  from full  model  simulations.  The  top  half  of  the  page 
shows  the  Japanese results  of  yen  depreciation,  while  the  bottom  half  shows  the 
U.S.  effects  of  dollar depreciation. 
For  Japan.  all  of  the  models  show  that  net  exports  increase  about  twice  as 
much  in  the  partial  simulations  as  they  do  in  the  full  model  results.  A  similar 
result holds  for  the  nominal  current account  balance,  although  here  the 
reduction is  rather  less for the OECD  than  for  the  other  models. 
For the  United  States,  all  of  the  models  show  even  greater differences 
between  the  partial  and  whole-model  results  than  is the  case for  Japan.  On 
average,  the  10%  depreciation  of  the  dollar improves  the  current  account,  in 
the  third  year. by  $35  billion  in the  partial  simulations,  compared to  $10 
billion in  the full  model  results.  The  macroeconomic offsets  are  greatest  in 
EPA  and  rather  modest in  OECD.  which shows  substantially  the  largest  full-model 
current balance effects  of  dollar  depreciation. 
The  general  conclusion  from the  evidence  presented  in  this  section is  that 
while  exchange rates do  tend  to  move in  response  to  fiscal  expansion,  these 
movements are  not  in  themselves  a  very  important  part of  the  current  account 
adjustment process that  follows  in  the  wake  of  changes  in  fiscal  policy.  The 22 
comparisons between  the  partial  and  full-model  results  of  exchange rate  changes 
show that the  results  does  not  come from  small  direct effects  of  exchange rates 
on  trade  flows,  but  from the  macroeconomic repercussions  that  tend  to  cut 
absorption  ri  the  appreciating  countries  and  increase  inflation  in  the 
depreciating countries,  thus  offsetting  the  effects  on  the  current balance. 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper has  had  a  double  purpose;  to  compare the  structures  of  three 
important  multinational  models,  and  to  use  their  evidence,  in  conjunction  with 
that from  other  models, to  analyze  the effects  of  Japanese and  United  States 
fiscal  policies on  their  own  and  the  other  country's  current balance.  This 
conclusion  draws these  two  strands  together  by  summarizing  what  the  three 
models have  to  say  about  the  three  questions  presented  at  the  beginning  of  the 
paper. 
The  experiments  prepared  for  this  symposium  did  not attempt  to  estimate 
the  extent  to  which  fiscal  imbalances were  responsible  for  international 
imbalances, although  earlier research  using  these  and  other  multinational 
models to  determine  the  sources of  the  U.S.  current  account deficit  suggests14 
that  divergent  fiscal  policies in  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  OECD 
were  responsible  for  about  two-thirds  of the  increase  in  the  U.S.  deficit,  with 
the  additionat  appreciation  of  the  dollar and  other  factors accounting  for the 
rest.  To  what extent  are  these imbalances  likely to  be  reversed  by  changes in 
14  See  especially  the  chapter by  Helkie  and  Hooper in  Bryant,  Hoitham  and 
Hooper,  eds.  (1988). 23 
fiscal  policies?  This  paper has  considered  Only  changes  in  the  United  States 
and  Japan. 
Based  on  the  evidence  from the  three  models  assessed  in  this  paper,  each 
$50  billion reduction in  U.S.  government  spending  is  estimated  to  lead,  by  the 
third  year,  to  a  $20 
billion reduction in  the  U.S.  external  deficit.  A  similar amount  of  extra 
spending  in  Japan  would,  by  the  third  year,  improve  the  U.S.  current balance by 
about  $4  billion.15  Thus  shifting  $50  billion  of  spending  from the  United 
States  to Japan would  improve  the  U.S.  current balance by $24  billion in  the 
third  year, about  half  of  the  amount  of  spending  transferred.  What  about  the 
effects on  the Japanese current  account? 
Increasing  Japanese  government  spending  by  3700  billion yen  would,  in  the 
third  year,  reduce  the  Japanese  current account surplus  by  about  700  billion 
yen.  Reducing U.S.  spending  by the  same amount  would  reduce the  Japanese 
current account surplus  by  an  average of 800  billion  yen.16  Thus  transferring 
3700 billion yen  of  spending  (1%  of  Japanese GNP)  from  the  United  States  to 
Japan  would  reduce the  Japanese  current account surplus  by  about  1500  billion 
15  These  results  are  from table  4.  Relative  to  the  typical  results  quoted  in  the  text,  MCM  shows  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  policy that  are  about  25%  larger, 
and  EPA  shows  effects  of  Japanese  fiscal  policy  that  are  about  half  as  great, 
with  a  third-year  effect  on  the  U.S.  current account  equal  to  $2  billion  for 
each  $50  billion  spent  in  Japan. 
16  These  results  are  from  table  5.  There  is  less  unanimity  among the 
models in  their  estimates  of  the  effects  of  fiscal  policies  on  the  Japanese 
current balance.  All  three  models  suggest,  however,  that  U.S.  and  Japanese 
fiscal  policies have  similar effects  on  the  Japanese  current  balance.  MCM  and 
EPA  show rather  similar results,  while  OECD  shows  effects  that  are  roughly  half 
as  big  as  for  the  other models. 24 
yen,  or  about  40%  of  the  amount  of  spending  transferred. 
Combining  this  evidence,  the  models  suggest  that  decreasing U.S. 
government  spending  by $50  billion,  with  spending  in  Japan  increased  by  the 
same amount,  would,  in  the  third  year,  reduce the  U.S.  current account deficit 
by  about  $25  billion and  reduce the  Japanese  external  surplus  by  $20  billion. 
The  models  are  not  uniform  in  their  estimates,  but they  all  agree in 
finding  some asymmetry  in  the  current balance effects  of  Japanese  and  U.S. 
fiscal  policies,  even  after  account  is  taken  of  the differing  sizes  and  trade 
patterns  of  the  two  countries.  The  main  reason for this  lies  in  the  greater 
crowding  out apparent in  the  U.S.  models,  and  the  greater  extent  to  which  the 
crowding  out  of  domestic  GNP  effects  is  in  favour  of imported  goods  and 
services. This  asymmetry  grows  with  time,  so  that  the  third-year  results 
reported above  for  U.S.  fiscal  contraction  would  show  less  improvement  in  the 
U.S.  balance  of  payments  if  reported  for the  second  year,  and  more  if  reported 
for  the  fourth  and  subsequent  years.  The  implication  of this  for  policy is  that 
while there  may  be  substantial  linkages  from fiscal  policies to  current 
balances,  they  accumulate  with  time,  and  cannot be  expected  to  have  dramatic 
effects  in  the  short term.  Viewed  from the  perspective  of  the  early  1980s,  the 
inference is  that  the  differential  fiscal  stances  of the  United  States  and  the 
rest  of  the  OECD  might  have  been  anticipated  to  lead  eventually  to  the  current 
account results  of  the  late  1980s. 
Finally,  what about  the  role  of exchange  rates in  the  fiscal  transmission 
process? This  was  the  subject of  section  4,  where  it was  shown that  exchange 25 
rates do  tend  to  move  during  the  adjustment  process,  generally  so  as  to 
appreciate the  currency of  the  fiscally  expanding  country.  However,  these 
exchange rate  movements  do  not  contribute  a very  large part of the  power  of  the 
expenditure  switching  process.  In  particular,  the  comparisons  between  the 
partial  and  the  full-model  results  of  exchange  rate  changes  show  that 
macroeconomic repercussions,  which  tend  to  reduce absorption  and  inflation  in 
the  appreciating  countries  and  to  increase  them in  the  depreciating  countries, 
act  to  truncate  the  substantial  direct effects  of  exchange  rates on  trade 
flows.17 
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